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Abstract—This paper investigates the problem of non-
cooperative game theoretic power allocation (NGTPA) for dis-
tributed multiple-radar architectures in a spectrum sharing en-
vironment, where multiple radars coexist with a communication
system in the same frequency band. The primary objective of
the multiple-radar system is to minimize the power consumption
of each radar by optimizing the transmission power allocation,
which are constrained by a predefined signal-to-interference-
plus-noise ratio (SINR) requirement for target detection and a
maximum interference tolerant limit for communication system.
Since each radar is rational and selfish to maximize its own
utility, we utilize the non-cooperative game theoretic technique
to tackle the distributed power allocation problem. Taking into
consideration the target detection performance and received
interference power at the communication receiver, a novel utility
function is defined and employed as the optimization criteri-
on for the NGTPA strategy. Furthermore, the existence and
uniqueness of the proposed game’s Nash equilibrium point are
analytically proved. An iterative power allocation algorithm with
low computational complexity and fast convergence is developed,
where the optimal value of each radar’s transmission power
is simultaneously updated at the same time step. Numerical
simulations are provided to verify the analysis and evaluate the
performance of the proposed strategy as a function of the system
parameters. It is shown that the distributed algorithm is effective
for power allocation and could protect the communication system
with limited implementation overhead.
Index Terms—Non-cooperative game theory, power allocation,
spectrum sharing, Nash equilibrium, distributed multiple-radar
architecture.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Background and Motivation
W ITH the recent advances in large bandwidth wirelessnetworks, multichannel electronically scanned anten-
nas, high-speed low-cost processors and precise synchroniza-
tion techniques, the implementation of distributed multiple-
radar architecture has become feasible and is on a path from
theory to practical use [1]. Due to the unique structure of
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the multiple-radar system, several diverse and independent
waveforms can be simultaneously emitted by multiple trans-
mitters [2]. It has been demonstrated that distributed multiple-
radar system with multiple transmitters and multiple receivers
at different sites has a number of performance advantages
over monostatic radar owing to its advantage of spatial and
waveform diversities, which has triggered a resurgence of
interest in distributed multiple-radar architecture. Therefore,
considerable research efforts have been devoted to the potential
use of such system for achieving performance improvement in
various contexts such as target detection [3][4], target local-
ization [5], target tracking [1][6], parameter estimation [7][8],
radar waveform design [9][10], sensor selection [11][12], and
information extraction [13].
Due to the services with high bandwidth requirements
and rapid growing of mobile telecommunications, the radio
frequency (RF) spectrum scarcity has become a very essential
and changing problem that the whole world has to face. One
of the feasible solutions is to improve spectrum efficiency
by employing the potential of existing spectrum. In recent
literature, the concept of spectrum sharing has been regarded
as a promising solution to resolve the issue of spectrum
congestion [14], which allows two or more users (radar or
wireless communication systems) to share the RF spectrum
as long as they do not generate any harmful interference to
each other. In [15], a dynamic spectrum allocation scheme
is proposed for the coexistence of a radar system with a
communication system, where the transmitted waveform and
power spectrum are jointly optimized under the constraint
that a predefined signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR)
requirement is met. In [16], Bica et al. investigate the problem
of time delay estimation for coexisting multicarrier radar and
communication systems, and it is shown that the radar can
enhance its target estimation performance by utilizing the
communication signals scattered off the target in a passive
way. More recently, recognizing that the exact knowledge of
target spectra is impossible to capture in practice, the problem
of power minimization based robust orthogonal frequency
division multiplexing (OFDM) radar waveform design for
the coexisting radar and communication systems in signal-
dependent clutter and colored noise is addressed in [17],
where the target spectra are assumed to lie in uncertainty sets
bounded by known upper and lower bounds. It is demon-
strated that exploiting the communication signals scattered
off the target can significantly reduce the power consumption
of radar system. In [18], Li et al. present a cooperative
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spectrum sharing approach, which improves the SINR of
the radar system by optimizing the multiple-input multiple-
output (MIMO) radar transmit precoder and the communica-
tion transmit covariance matrix with a given rate constraint
for the communication system. Reference [19] also provides a
novel framework for coexisting communication systems and
pulsed radars. The problem of user association and power
allocation in millimeter-wave-based ultra dense networks is
investigated with the consideration of user quality of service
(QoS) requirements, energy efficiency, and interference limits
[20].
B. Brief Survey of Similar Work
An established powerful tool for distributed optimization
problems can be provided by the non-cooperative game theory
[21]. Each player in such a game behaves in a selfish and
rational fashion to maximize its own gain (utility) as a best
response to the actions of the other players [22]. Game theo-
retic models are traditionally investigated and applied in areas
of economics, politics science and biology, and has emerged in
recent years as an effective and powerful tool for radar network
and signal processing. Among the early contributions in this
area, the authors in [23] propose a polarimetric design algo-
rithm for target detection in distributed MIMO radar system.
In [24], the interaction between a smart target and a smart
MIMO radar is modelled as a two-person zero-sum game.
In the spirit of these studies, extensive literatures have since
concentrated on developing power management techniques for
radar network subject to system performance requirements
and resource constraints. For example, Bacci et al. in [25]
develop a game theory based distributed algorithm for radar
network, which optimally allocates the transmission power to
each radar while improving the target detection performance
in terms of probabilities of detection and false alarm. In [26], a
non-cooperative game theory based power allocation approach
is proposed for a multistatic MIMO radar network, whose
main objective is to minimize the total power consumption of
the system while maintaining a desired SINR threshold. Fur-
thermore, reference [27] studies the problem of robust power
allocation in the presence of estimation error. Deligiannis et
al. in [28] investigate the competitive power allocation game
between a radar network and multiple jammers, and a Bayesian
game theory based SINR maximization and power allocation
algorithm is explored in [29]. Later, they revisit the power
allocation problem of a multistatic MIMO radar network [2],
which is formulated as a generalized Nash game. The objective
of the radar network is to minimize the total transmission
power while satisfying a given target detection criterion.
In view of the aforementioned works, the problem of radar
and communication systems in spectral coexistence has been
extensively investigated, whereas it is still at an early stage
and there exist many aspects need to be further improved: (a)
All the existing studies solely concentrate on the monostatic
radar, which is not appropriate for the practical extension to
the distributed multiple-radar system. In the latter case, the
limitations and calculations are much more complicated; (b)
Although the non-cooperative game model is employed to
perform power allocation in multistatic radar, the analytical
closed-form expressions for game theoretic power allocation
have not yet been derived; (c) The non-cooperative game
theoretic models have not been utilized to conduct spectrum
sharing between multiple-radar and communication systems.
On the other hand, although the authors of [14] propose an idea
to solve the problem of radar and long term evolution (LTE)
systems coexistence by employing non-cooperative game, both
the detailed algorithm and numerical results are not given. In
particular, reference [30] proposes an incomplete channel state
information (CSI)-based power allocation and sub-channel
assignment algorithm for heterogeneous networks, which is
modeled as a non-cooperative game with the consideration
of cross-tier/co-tier interference constraints. Our work builds
on the non-cooperative game theoretic framework presented
in [30]. Despite this similarity, the analysis of [30] does
not account for the spectral coexistence between multiple-
radar and communication systems, thus the resulting game
theoretic model is not suitable for the problem scenario here.
Incorporating target detection requirements and aggregate in-
terference changes the setting drastically, which is because the
power allocation policy of distributed multiple-radar system
depends not only on the maximum interference tolerant limit
of communication system, but also on the target scattering
characteristics and system geometry configuration. In this
study, we will extend the analyses in [14][30] and the problem
we will address is how to optimize transmit power allocation
for a multistatic radar system coexisting with a communication
system in the same frequency band. To the best of our
knowledge, the problem of power allocation for distributed
multiple-radar architecture in a spectrum sharing environment
has not been well addressed in previous studies, and we will
investigate this problem based on a non-cooperative game for
the first time.
C. Major Contributions
In this paper, different from the existing algorithms, we
investigate the power allocation problem of a distributed
multiple-radar configuration, which is composed of multi-
ple radars coexisting with a communication system in the
same frequency band. We are primarily interested in a non-
cooperative method due to the fact that in a future distributed
multiple-radar system, there may be some implementation
difficulties or the netted radars may not be controlled by the
fusion center and these radars may not cooperate. Thus, it is
preferred to consider autonomous distributed power allocation
techniques [2], which also have an important advantage of
avoiding the energy consumption associated with centralized
policies requiring remarkable information exchange between
radars and/or the system controller [31]. Note that the pro-
posed strategy is particularly attractive for target tracking
where the location and velocity of the target are approximately
estimated, but fine detection performance is required to retrieve
the exact target’s position and characteristics. In this scenario,
the primary goal of the multiple-radar system is to guarantee
a predefined SINR requirement for target detection and secure
a maximum aggregate interference tolerant limit for commu-
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nication system, while minimizing the power consumption of
each radar by optimizing the transmission power allocation.
The major contributions of this work are listed as follows:
(1) The problem of non-cooperative game theoretic power
allocation (NGTPA) for the coexisting multiple-radar
and communication systems is investigated. Mathemat-
ically speaking, the NGTPA strategy is a problem of
minimizing the power consumption of each radar subject
to a desired SINR requirement for target detection and
a maximum aggregate interference tolerant limit for
communication system. Since each radar is rational and
selfish to maximize its own utility, we employ the non-
cooperative game theoretic technique to tackle the dis-
tributed power allocation problem. Previously, most of
the power allocation works adopt the total transmission
power as the utility function [2][26][27]. However, the
received aggregate interference power at the communi-
cation system in a spectrum sharing environment is not
considered, and thus it is reasonable for us to incorporate
the transmission power of each radar, the specified SINR
threshold and the maximum interference tolerant limit
to define a novel utility function as the optimization
criterion. As such, the basis of the NGTPA strategy is
to optimally allocate the minimum transmission power
to each radar, which can result in the maximization of
the defined utility function.
(2) The Nash equilibrium of the non-cooperative power
allocation game is obtained based on the Lagrangian
dual function and sub-gradient approach. The existence
and uniqueness of the proposed game model to its Nash
equilibrium points are also demonstrated.
(3) Iterative power allocation algorithm with low compu-
tational complexity and fast convergence is developed,
which determines the Nash equilibrium solutions to the
NGTPA model starting from any initial feasible points.
The proposed algorithm also ensures the distributed
nature of the system with considerable reduction on
the signaling overhead, confirming its potential for a
practical scenario.
(4) Numerical results are provide to demonstrate the supe-
riority of the proposed NGTPA strategy compared to
various state of the art algorithms. It is shown that
the NGTPA scheme not only guarantees the desired
SINR requirement for target detection and secure the
maximum interference tolerant limit for communication
system, but also allocates the minimum transmission
power to each radar. Additionally, we also reveal the
relationships between the power allocation results and
the following two factors: target’s radar cross section
(RCS) and the relative geometry between target and
distributed multiple-radar architectures.
D. Outline of the Paper
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The
distributed multiple-radar architecture coexisting with a com-
munication system as well as the underlying assumptions
needed in this paper are introduced in Section II. In Section
Fig. 1. Illustration of the system model for spectrum sharing between
distributed multiple-radar architecture and communication system with their
corresponding channel gains.
III-A, the basis of the non-cooperative game theoretic power
allocation strategy is introduced. Section III-B presents the
game theoretic formulation of the problem. The existence and
uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium are proved analytically
in Section IV. In Section V, a non-cooperative distributed
low-complexity and iterative algorithm is developed to de-
termine the NGTPA model’s solution. The performance of
the proposed strategy is assessed in detail via modeling and
simulation in Section VI, whose superiority compared to
other existing methods is illustrated via detailed comparative
numerical results. Finally, the concluding remarks of this paper
are made in Section VII.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Problem Scenario
Let us consider a scenario, where a distributed multiple-
radar architecture consisting of MT radars coexist with a
communication system in the same frequency band. Such a
multiple-radar system with a possible target is depicted in
Fig.1. The main goal of the distributed multiple-radar con-
figuration is to minimize the transmission power of each radar
by optimizing the transmission power allocation, which is con-
strained by a predefined SINR requirement for target detection
and a maximum interference tolerant limit for communication
system. The ith radar receives the echoes from the target
due to its transmitted signals as well as the signals from the
other radars, both scattered off the target and through a direct
path. The waveforms emitted from different radars may not be
orthogonal because of various reasons, including the absence
of radar transmission synchronization [32], which could induce
considerable mutual interference. Assuming that successive
interference cancellation (SIC) technique is employed at each
radar receiver to remove both direct and target scattered
communication signals from the observed signal [16]. At the
communication system, it is also supposed that the radar
transmitted signal scattered off the target is much weaker than
that coming through the direct path from the radar transmitter,
which is ignored for simplicity.
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B. Signal Model
This subsection describes signal model and presents system
parameters utilized in the following. In the considered non-
cooperative game theoretic framework, each radar performs
target detection autonomously. It is assumed that each radar
can determine the presence of a target by employing a bi-
nary hypothesis testing on the received signal based on the
generalized likelihood ratio test (GLRT) [2]. Thus, the N
time-domain samples of the received signals for radar i, with
H0 corresponding to the target absence hypothesis and H1
corresponding to the target presence hypothesis, can be given
by: 
H0 : si =
MT∑
j=1,j 6=i
βi,j
√
Pjxj + wi,
H1 : si = αi
√
Pixi +
MT∑
j=1,j 6=i
βi,j
√
Pjxj + wi,
(1)
where xi = φiai denotes the transmitted waveform from radar
i, ai = [1, ej2pifD,i , · · · , ej2pi(N−1)fD,i ] denotes the Doppler
steering vector of radar i with respect to the target, fD,i
is the Doppler shift associated with the radar i, N is the
number of received pulses in the time-on-target, and φi is the
predesigned waveform transmitted from radar i. αi represents
the channel gain at the direction of the target, Pi is the transmit
power of radar i, βi,j stands for the cross gain between
radar i and j, and wi denotes a zero-mean white Gaussian
noise with variance σ2w. It is assumed that αi ∼ CN (0, hti,i),
βi,j ∼ CN (0, ci,j(hti,j + hdi,j)) and wi ∼ CN (0, σ2w), where
hti,i represents the variance of the channel gain for the radar
i-target-radar i path, ci,jhti,j represents the variance of the
channel gain for the radar i-target-radar j path, ci,jhdi,j rep-
resents the variance of the channel gain for the direct radar
i-radar j path, and ci,j denotes the cross correlation coefficient
between the ith radar and jth radar.
Define the propagation gains of the corresponding paths as:
hti,i =
GtGrσ
RCS
i,i λ
2
(4pi)3R4i
,
hti,j =
GtGrσ
RCS
i,j λ
2
(4pi)3R2iR
2
j
,
hdi,j =
G
′
tG
′
rλ
2
(4pi)2d2i,j
,
gdi =
G
′
tGcλ
2
(4pi)2d2i
,
(2)
where hti,i represents the propagation gain for the radar i-
target-radar i path, hti,j represents the propagation gain for
the radar i-target-radar j path, hdi,j represents the direct radar
i-radar j path, gdi represents the direct radar i-communication
system path. Gt is the radar main-lobe transmitting antenna
gain, Gr is the radar main-lobe receiving antenna gain, G
′
t is
the radar side-lobe transmitting antenna gain, G
′
r is the radar
side-lobe receiving antenna gain, and Gc is the communication
receiving antenna gain. σRCSi,i is the RCS of the target with
respect to the ith radar, σRCSi,j is the RCS of the target from
radar i to radar j, λ denotes the wavelength, Ri denotes the
distance from radar i to the target, Rj denotes the distance
from radar j to the target, di,j denotes the distance between
radar i and radar j, di denotes the distance between radar i
and communication system. All the channel gains are assumed
to be fixed during observation.
Here, the generalized likelihood ratio test (GLRT) is used
to determine the appropriate detector [2][26]. The probabilities
of detection pD,i(δi, γi) and false alarm pFA,i(δi) are: pD,i(δi, γi) =
(
1 +
δi
1− δi ·
1
1 +Nγi
)1−N
,
pFA,i(δi) = (1− δi)N−1,
(3)
where δi is the detection threshold, N is the number of
received pulses in the time-on-target. γi denotes the SINR
received at the ith radar, which can be given by:
γi =
hti,iPi∑MT
j=1,j 6=i ci,j
(
hdi,jPj + h
t
i,jPj
)
+ σ2w
, (4)
It can be seen from Equation (4) that the numerator of the
SINR describes the return signal scattered off the target, while
the dominator consists of the interference and noise [33]. Thus,
Equation (4) can equivalently be rewritten as:
γi =
hti,iPi
I−i
, (5)
where the total interference and noise received at the ith radar
is defined as:
I−i =
MT∑
j=1,j 6=i
ci,j
(
hdi,jPj + h
t
i,jPj
)
+ σ2w. (6)
To guarantee its target detection performance, the received
SINR of radar i should be no smaller than a predefined
minimum value denoted by γmin. Then, we obtain a target
detection condition as:
γi ≥ γmin. (7)
Finally, it is also assumed that the transmit power of each
radar is individually limited by Pmaxi , that is:
0 ≤ Pi ≤ Pmaxi . (8)
C. Interference Power Constraint
This subsection presents the transmission interference reg-
ulation between the distributed multiple-radar and communi-
cation systems accounted in the system model.
In this work, the distributed multiple-radar architecture is
allowed to coexist with a wireless communication system in
the same frequency band provided that the degradation induced
on the QoS of the communication system is tolerable. Thus,
it is crucial to impose interference power constraint to control
the harmful interference generated by the multiple radars.
The interference power constraint is utilized to prevent the
total aggregate interference generated by all radars to the
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communication user from exceeding a predetermined threshold
Tmax, which can be expressed as:
MT∑
i=1
gdi Pi ≤ Tmax, (9)
where Tmax represents the maximum interference tolerant limit
prescribed by the communication system. In this way, the
communication user’s transmission can be protected when
the transmit power of distributed multiple-radar system is
constrained by the maximum interference tolerant threshold
Tmax.
Remark 1: Technically speaking, the target detection per-
formance can be evaluated in terms of the probabilities of
detection pD,i(δi, γi) and false alarm pFA,i(δi) for each radar
[2]. The GLRT utilized here is similar to the Neyman-
Pearson detector as the number of samples approaches infinity.
Then, the detection threshold δi can be calculated from the
predefined probability of false alarm pFA,i(δi), whereas the
probability of detection pD,i(δi, γi) depends on the threshold
δi and the SINR associated with the received signal. There-
fore, given the probabilities of detection and false alarm, the
specified SINR value γmin can be determined. In order to
examine the interaction among radars and determine the best
strategy for each radar, we propose to optimize transmission
power allocation for the distributed multiple-radar architecture
coexisting with a communication system by exploiting a non-
cooperative game model, as presented in the next section.
III. GAME THEORETIC STRATEGY FOR POWER
ALLOCATION
A. Basis of the Technique
Mathematically, the non-cooperative game theoretic power
allocation strategy for spectrum sharing can be described as a
problem of minimizing the power consumption of each radar
subject to a predefined SINR requirement for target detection
and a maximum interference tolerant limit for communication
system. Consider that radars in the system are selfish and
greedy to maximize their own utilities, the non-cooperative
game theory is exploited to model the interactions between
different radars as a Nash game. Then, the existence and u-
niqueness of Nash equilibrium are proved analytically. Finally,
an iterative power allocation algorithm with low computational
complexity and fast convergence is proposed to play the game
among different radars.
We are then in a position to optimize the transmission power
allocation for multiple-radar system in a spectrum sharing
environment. The general power allocation strategy can be
detailed as follows.
B. Game Theoretic Formulation
As previously stated, the main objective is to minimize
the power consumption of each radar by optimizing the
transmission power allocation, which is constrained by a pre-
defined SINR requirement for target detection and a maximum
interference tolerant limit for communication system. It can
be observed from (4) and (9) that increased power allocation
can improve the target detection performance, which in turn
induces higher interference to the communication system and
consequently to the remaining radars of the architecture.
Hence, in order to consider players’ rational and self-interested
behavior, game theory arises as an efficient mathematical tool.
To be specific, the radars that act as players compete with each
other and choose a strategy space of transmission power and
subsequently achieve a payoff, which is expressed by their
utility functions.
The characteristics of the interaction of the players in the
non-cooperative power allocation game in strategic form can
be expressed by:
G = 〈K, {Pi}i∈K, {Ui}i∈K〉 , (10)
where K = {1, · · · ,MT } denotes the finite set of players, Pi
denotes the ith player’s strategy space, where Pi = [0, Pmaxi ],
and Ui denotes the player’s utility function. The strategy space
of the NGTPA model P depends not only on the strategy of
the ith player Pi but also on the strategies of all other players
P−i, that is, P = P1 ×P2 × · · · × PMT , where the subscript
−i represents all players except player i.
It is very important to select an ideal utility function when
utilizing non-cooperative game theory. For spectrum sharing
between multiple-radar system and communication system,
the target detection performance and received aggregate in-
terference power at the communication receiver should be
taken into account, which should be reflected in the utility
function. Utility function is the foundation of game theo-
ry, which will deduce the iterative algorithm. Moreover, as
indicated in [22], whether the utility function is better or
not depends on the iterative algorithm deduced by the utility
function. If the algorithm does not converge or cannot get
ideal transmission power and SINR value, the utility function
will be discarded. Here, the primary objective of the multiple-
radar architecture is to minimize the transmission power of
each radar while guaranteeing a predefined SINR requirement
for target detection and a maximum interference tolerant limit
for communication system. Therefore, a novel utility function
can be defined as:
Ui(Pi,P−i) = ln(γi − γmin)− µihti,iPi − ϑi
MT∑
i=1
gdi Pi, (11)
where P−i is the power allocation adopted by all radars
apart from radar i, µi and ϑi denote the time-varying pricing
variables corresponding to the radar transmit power and the ag-
gregate interference caused by the radar transmission, respec-
tively. In (11), one can observe that the utility function is com-
posed of three components. The first component ln(γi− γmin)
measures the utility of a radar when certain target detection
performance is required. The second component µihti,iPi is
a penalty term corresponding to the radar transmission power
pricing cost, while the third one ϑi
∑MT
i=1 g
d
i Pi is also a penalty
term representing the aggregate interference pricing cost.
The goal of each player is to maximize its utility by
selecting an appropriate strategy of transmission power. Hence,
consider a specified SINR requirement for target detection
and a maximum interference tolerant limit for communication
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system, the NGTPA model can be formulated mathematically
as a distributed utility maximization problem, as follows:
P1 : max{Pi∈Pi}i∈K Ui(Pi,P−i), (12a)
s.t. :

C1 : 0 ≤ Pi ≤ Pmaxi ,∀i ∈ K,
C2 : γi ≥ γmin,∀i ∈ K,
C3 :
∑MT
i=1 g
d
i Pi ≤ Tmax.
(12b)
The first constraint C1 limits the transmit power of each
radar to be below Pmaxi , the second constraint C2 implies
that the power allocation results should be no less than the
predetermined SINR threshold γmin, while the last constraint
C3 stands that the total received interference power at the com-
munication receiver cannot exceed the maximum interference
tolerant limit Tmax.
Given the decisions made by the rest of the players, the
individual decision of each player can be concluded. Thus, the
solution of the non-cooperative power allocation game should
determine the optimal equilibrium for the multiple-radar sys-
tem in a spectrum sharing environment. In the following, the
Nash equilibrium point of the proposed NGTPA model can be
defined as:
Definition 1 (Nash Equilibrium): A power vector P∗i =
(P ∗i ,P
∗
−i) in the strategy set P
∗
i ∈ P is a Nash equilibrium of
the NGTPA model G if for every player i ∈ K the following
condition holds true:
U(P ∗i ,P
∗
−i) ≥ U(Pi,P∗−i), (13)
for all Pi ∈ Pi.
The objective of a non-cooperative game is to find a
Nash equilibrium point at which none of the players has the
incentive to change its strategy. This is because the player
cannot unilaterally improve its personal utility by making any
change to its own strategy, given the strategies of the rest of the
players. Therefore, it is worth to point out that the existence
of Nash equilibrium solution guarantees a stable outcome of
the NGTPA model, while on the contrary, the non-existence of
such a Nash equilibrium solution is translated to an unstable
and unsteady situation of the game model.
Subsequently, taking the first derivative of Ui(Pi,P−i) with
respect to Pi, we can obtain:
∂Ui(Pi,P−i)
∂Pi
=
1
γi − γmin
hti,i
I−i
− µihti,i − ϑigdi , (14)
Then, we set the first derivative ∂Ui(Pi,P−i)∂Pi = 0. Rearranging
terms yields:
1
γi − γmin
hti,i
I−i
= µih
t
i,i + ϑig
d
i . (15)
After basic algebraic manipulations, we have:
γi = γmin +
hti,i
I−i
1
µihti,i + ϑig
d
i
. (16)
Substituting γi =
hti,iPi
I−i
into Equation (16), we can obtain the
ith radar transmit power optimum point as follows:
Pi =
I−i
hti,i
γmin +
1
µihti,i + ϑig
d
i
. (17)
Obviously, according to Equations (5) and (17), (18) can
be used to obtain the Nash equilibrium solutions P∗i through
iterations as:
P
(ite+1)
i =
P
(ite)
i
γ
(ite)
i
γmin +
1
µ
(ite)
i h
t
i,i + ϑ
(ite)
i g
d
i
, (18)
where ite denotes the iteration index.
On the basis of Equation (18), the corresponding ith radar
transmit power iteration function can be expressed by:
P
(ite+1)
i =
[
P
(ite)
i
γ
(ite)
i
γmin +
1
µ
(ite)
i h
t
i,i + ϑ
(ite)
i g
d
i
]Pmaxi
0
, (19)
where [x]ba = max{min(x, b), a}.
In this paper, the dynamic pricing method is considered,
where the pricing variables will be updated in the proposed
iterative power allocation algorithm in Section V. It should
be noted that the selection of pricing variable µi is of high
importance. More precisely, if γ(ite)i ≤ γmin, µ(ite+1)i remains
unchanged; whereas if γ(ite)i > γmin, we adjust the level of
µ
(ite+1)
i = µ
(ite)
i
(
γ
(ite)
i
γmin
)2
adaptively, which decreases the
transmit power by increasing the punishment for player i. In
addition, to guarantee the proposed iterative algorithm can
achieve Nash equilibrium, the sub-gradient approach [34] is
adopted to update the pricing variable ϑ(ite)i as follows:
ϑ
(ite+1)
i =
[
ϑ
(ite)
i − α(ite)
(
Tmax −
MT∑
i=1
gdi P
(ite+1)
i
)]+
,
(20)
where (x)+ = max(0, x), α(ite) is the step size of iteration
ite (ite ∈ (1, 2, · · · , Lmax)), Lmax is the maximum number
of iterations. It is noted that α(ite) is locally updated, which
should satisfy the following conditions:
∞∑
l=1
α(l) =∞,
lim
l→∞
α(l) = 0.
(21)
C. Potential Extension
Without loss of generality, we concentrate on a single com-
munication system case in this work. However, the derivations
and results can be extended to the multiple communication
systems scenario, in which the interference limits are imposed
to protect each communication user’s QoS. For Q communi-
cation users case, the resulting optimization problem can be
reformulated as:
P2 : max{Pi∈Pi}i∈K Ui(Pi,P−i), (22a)
s.t. :

C1 : 0 ≤ Pi ≤ Pmaxi ,∀i ∈ K,
C2 : γi ≥ γmin,∀i ∈ K,
C3 :
∑MT
i=1 g
d
i,qPi ≤ Tq,max,∀q ∈ Q.
(22b)
where the parameters with subscript q denote the correspond-
ing ones of communication user q (q ∈ Q = {1, 2, · · · , Q}).
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Then, we can also employ the following iterative power allo-
cation algorithm to search for the Nash equilibrium solutions
for P2. In this scenario, we can conclude that the proposed
NGTPA strategy can straightforward be extended to multiple
communication users case by adding the interference limits
for each user.
IV. EXISTENCE AND UNIQUENESS OF THE NASH
EQUILIBRIUM
To analyse the outcome of the presented non-cooperative
game theoretic power allocation model, we first introduce the
basic theorems to prove the existence and uniqueness of a
Nash equilibrium.
A. Existence
Theorem 1 (Existence): The proposed NGTPA model G =
〈K, {Pi}i∈K, {Ui}i∈K〉 has at least one Nash equilibrium.
Proof of Theorem 1: At least one Nash equilibrium exists
in the proposed NGTPA model G = 〈K, {Pi}i∈K, {Ui}i∈K〉.
If for ∀i ∈ K:
(a) The transmission power Pi is a non-empty, convex and
compact subset of some Euclidean space.
(b) The utility function Ui(Pi,P−i) is continuous in power
domain P and quasi-concave in Pi.
It is evident that our proposed NGTPA strategy satisfies the
first Condition (a), which is because each radar’s transmission
power Pi ranges from 0 to Pmaxi .
One can notice from Equation (11) that the utility functions
Ui(Pi,P−i)(∀i ∈ K) are continuous with respect to Pi. Now
take the first derivative of Ui(Pi,P−i) with respect to Pi, we
can obtain:
∂Ui(Pi,P−i)
∂Pi
=
1
γi − γmin
hti,i
I−i
− µihti,i − ϑigdi , (23)
then we take the second order derivative of Ui(Pi,P−i) with
respect to Pi and obtain:
∂2Ui(Pi,P−i)
∂P 2i
= − (h
t
i,i)
2
I2−i(γi − γmin)2
. (24)
Obviously, the second order derivative of Ui(Pi,P−i) with
respect to Pi is less than 0, thus,
∂2Ui(Pi,P−i)
∂P 2i
< 0, (25)
Ui(Pi,P−i) is concave with respect to Pi. As a result, the
utility functions are continuous and quasi-concave. This proves
the existence of Nash equilibrium in the proposed NGTPA
model. 
B. Uniqueness
It is worth to point out that Theorem 1 guarantees the ex-
istence of at least one Nash equilibrium point of the proposed
NGTPA model, while this point is not necessarily unique. In
this subsection, the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium for the
non-cooperative game G is demonstrated.
Theorem 2 (Uniqueness): The Nash equilibrium of the pro-
posed NGTPA model G = 〈K, {Pi}i∈K, {Ui}i∈K〉 is unique.
Proof of Theorem 2: Aiming at showing that the Nash
equilibrium of the proposed game model G is unique, we have
to prove that radar’s best response strategy function:
f(Pi) =
Pi
γi
γmin +
1
µihti,i + ϑig
d
i
should be standard, which satisfies the following conditions:
(a) Positivity: For ∀i ∈ K, f(Pi) > 0.
(b) Monotonicity: If P 1i > P
2
i , f(P
1
i ) > f(P
2
i ).
(c) Scalability: For all a > 1, af(Pi) > f(aPi).
For Condition (a), it is apparent that:
f(Pi) =
Pi
γi
γmin +
1
µihti,i + ϑig
d
i
> 0.
Hence, the positivity property is satisfied.
For Condition (b), if P 1i > P
2
i ,
f(P 1i )− f(P 2i )
=
P 1i − P 2i
γi
γmin +
(
1
µihti,i + ϑig
d
i
− 1
µihti,i + ϑig
d
i
)
=
P 1i − P 2i
γi
γmin > 0. (26)
Then,
f(P 1i )− f(P 2i ) > 0. (27)
Hence, the monotonicity property is satisfied.
For Condition (c), ∀i ∈ K,
af(Pi)− f(aPi)
= a
(
Pi
γi
γmin +
1
µihti,i + ϑig
d
i
)
−
(
aPi
γi
γmin +
1
µihti,i + ϑig
d
i
)
=
a
µihti,i + ϑig
d
i
− 1
µihti,i + ϑig
d
i
=
a− 1
µihti,i + ϑig
d
i
. (28)
Owing to a > 1, we can obtain:
a− 1
µihti,i + ϑig
d
i
> 0. (29)
Then,
af(Pi)− f(aPi) > 0. (30)
Hence, the scalability property is satisfied.
In conclusion, the best response strategy function f(Pi) is
standard. Therefore, our proposed non-cooperative power allo-
cation model has only one unique Nash equilibrium solution,
which completes the Nash equilibrium uniqueness proof. 
V. ITERATIVE POWER ALLOCATION ALGORITHM
Herein, a distributed iterative and low complexity power
allocation algorithm is developed, which determines the Nash
equilibrium point of NGTPA model starting from any initial
feasible point.
The presented NGTPA strategy is executed by each radar
at each time step in a distributed manner so that the Nash
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equilibrium point of NGTPA model can be determined, that
is, each radar determines its optimal transmission power and
achieved SINR value. For this reason, Algorithm 1 is suitable
for asynchronous implementation in dynamic network archi-
tectures, where each radar only requires the transmit strategies
of all the other radars, without any further information on the
system [31]. Thus, the iteration power allocation algorithm is
a fully distributed process and its pseudo-code is summarized
in Algorithm 1, which is based on the existence of a unique
Nash equilibrium for the proposed NGTPA model.
Algorithm 1 : Iterative Power Allocation Algorithm
1: set iteration index ite = 0;
2: initialize P (ite=0)i with a random feasible power alloca-
tion among all radars; γmin, Tmax, µi, ϑi, and ε > 0 (ε is a
small positive constant); Obtain the corresponding channel
gains.
3: repeat
for i = 1 to MT do
a) update P (ite)i by solving (19), and broadcast
those values to all the other radars via data link;
b) if γ(ite)i > γmin
µ
(ite+1)
i ← µ(ite)i
(
γ
(ite)
i
γmin
)2
;
else
µ
(ite+1)
i ← µ(ite)i ;
end if
c) update ϑ(ite+1)i by solving (20);
end for
set ite← ite+ 1;
4: until
∣∣∣P (ite+1)i − P (ite)i ∣∣∣ < ε for all i ∈ K or ite = Lmax.
Remark 2 (Implementation Overhead): Each radar updates
its action at each iteration step such that the utility function
in problem P1 is maximized. In the foregoing procedure, the
transmission power iteration function P (ite+1)i can be updated
according to (19), where the optimum power allocation results
can be determined locally.
In order to implement Algorithm 1 in a distributed manner,
each radar has to compute and estimate the channel gains
{hti,j}MTj=1,j 6=i, {hdi,j}MTj=1,j 6=i, {hti,i}MTi=1, and {gdi }MTi=1. This can
be done by having each radar measures the channel and feed
back to its transmitter. At each radar receiver, the interference
caused by all the other radars is treated as noise. Here, the
best response of the ith radar P ∗i depends on the strategies of
all the other radars, that is, P∗−i. During the iteration, each
radar only needs to broadcast its transmit strategy to the other
radars via data link, and thus the signaling overhead for the
convergence are quite low [35].
Remark 3 (Complexity Analysis): The computational com-
plexity of Algorithm 1 is dominated by the size of multiple-
radar system and the procedure of sub-gradient iteration steps.
In Algorithm 1, the calculation of (19) for each radar in
the distributed multiple-radar system entails MT operations
in each iteration. Assume the sub-gradient method employed
in Algorithm 1 requires ∆ iterations to converge, the update
of ϑi needs O(MT ) operations. Hence, ∆ is a polynomial
TABLE I
SYSTEM PARAMETERS
Parameter Value Parameter Value
Gt 27 dB Gr 27 dB
G
′
t −30 dB G
′
r −30 dB
Gc 0 dB σ2w 10
−18 W
Tmax −105 dBmW ci,j 0.01
λ 0.10 m Pmaxi (∀i) 1000 W
ε 10−16 µi(∀i) 1010
function of MT . The total complexity of Algorithm 1 is
O(MT∆).
Additionally, the convergence performance of NGTPA strat-
egy, in terms of necessary iterations, is thoroughly evaluated
in the following section, demonstrating the fast convergence
property of the proposed scheme.
VI. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES AND ANALYSIS
In this section, simulation results are provided to verify the
accuracy of the theoretical derivations as well as access the
performance of the proposed non-cooperative game theoretic
power allocation strategy. Besides, the effects of several factors
on the equilibrium power allocation results are studied.
A. Numerical Setup
For numerical simulations, it is assumed a distributed
multiple-radar system with MT = 4 radars. The positions
of multiple radars, communication system and target are
illustrated in Fig.2. To investigate the dependence of the
power allocation strategy on the relative geometry between
the target and the multiple-radar configuration, two different
target locations with respect to the multiple-radar system are
chosen. In the first case, it is supposed that the target is located
at [0, 0]km. In the second case, we simulate a scenario where
the target is located at [− 25√
2
, 25√
2
]km. In every time slot, each
radar receives N = 512 pulses. The maximum number of
iterations is set to be Lmax = 25 to study the convergence of
the proposed non-cooperative game model. We set the system
parameters as given in TABLE I.
Here, two target RCS models are adopted. The first RCS
model is uniform reflectivity, where σRCS1 = [1, 1, 1, 1]m
2. On
the other hand, in order to evaluate the effect of the target’s
RCS on the power allocation results, we also utilize the second
RCS model σRCS2 = [1, 0.2, 3, 5]m
2.
Before the initialization of the non-cooperative game the-
oretic model, the target detection performance, namely the
desired SINR threshold γmin, should be first determined. In
the considered scenario, we set the desired probabilities of
false alarm and detection at pFA = 10−6 and pD = 0.9973,
respectively. Then, we can obtain the detection threshold
δi = 0.0267 for each radar, and the corresponding SINR
γmin = 10 dB.
B. Simulation Results
In order to study the convergence performance of the
proposed NGTPA model, Fig.3 plots the transmission power
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Fig. 2. Simulated 2D scenario with locations of multiple radars, communi-
cation system and target.
allocation iterations of all the radars in the system for dif-
ferent initial power allocations, where the game is initialized
with P = [60, 10, 160, 200]W, P = [100, 100, 100, 100]W,
P = [280, 570, 120, 60]W, and P = [210, 100, 50, 350]W,
respectively. One can observe from Fig.3 that the efficiency
of the NGTPA model is evident, which only needs about 9-
12 iterations to reach the optimal power allocation strategy.
The results highlight that regardless of the initial strategy
of the players, the NGTPA model converges to the unique
Nash equilibrium. In addition, as the number of iterations
increases, the interference power to the communication user
tends to approach the predefined interference limits. Therefore,
the proposed Algorithm 1 converges.
Furthermore, the transmit power ratio results in different
cases employing the proposed NGTPA strategy are highlighted
in Fig.4, where the transmit power ratio is defined as:
pii =
Pi∑MT
i=1 Pi
. (31)
In Fig.4 (a) & (b), it can be seen that more transmission
power is allocated to Radar 1 and Radar 2 to guarantee the
predetermined SINR requirement, as the target’s RCSs with
respect to these two radars are smaller than others. Now, to
show the importance of the relative geometry between the
target and distributed multiple-radar architectures, we change
the target position for which we are calculating the power
allocation strategy to [− 25√
2
, 25√
2
]km, and provide the power
allocation update of all the radars in Fig.4 (c) & (d). In Fig.4
(c), less transmission power is assigned to Radar 1, Radar 2,
and Radar 3, as they are closer to the target. That is to say, the
radar farther from the target tends to be allocated more power.
Hence, we can conclude from these subfigures that higher
power is allocated to the radars with relative weaker propaga-
tion channel gains in the iterative process. The transmission
power allocation strategy is determined by the following two
factors: the target’s RCS and the relative geometry between
target and distributed multiple-radar architectures.
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Fig. 3. Convergence of power allocation results in each Case: (a) Case 1 with
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1 , (d) Case 2 with σ
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In Fig.5, the SINR convergence curves of the proposed
NGTPA algorithm are depicted. It is apparent that the achieved
SINR tends to converge to the specified SINR threshold γmin =
10 dB when the number of iterations approaches 8. Therefore,
we can notice that the proposed power allocation strategy can
meet the SINR requirement of each radar, confirming that the
NGTPA model can maintain fairness among all the radars
in the system. From Figs.4 & 5, it should be the proposed
NGTPA strategy is attractive for target tracking application,
where the fine target detection performance is required to
obtain the exact location of the target. In this scenario, the
aim is to optimize the transmit power allocation to guarantee
a specified SINR value hence probability of target detection.
In order to assess the efficiency of the presented power
allocation algorithm, we compare the results of the proposed
method with other three algorithms for power allocation: the
uniform power allocation algorithm, the Koskie and Gajic’s
(K-G) algorithm in [21], and the adaptive non-cooperative
power control algorithm (ANCPCA) in [33]. By imposing
an additional constraint in the P1, which allocates uniformly
the transmission power among the radars in the system, we
can obtain the non-cooperative game theory based uniform
power allocation (NGTUPA) algorithm. From Figs.6 & 7, it
is worth to point out that the proposed NGTPA strategy not
only minimizes the transmission power but also maintains the
desired SINR threshold of each radar. This is because the
radars in the system perceive the interference environment well
and accordingly make the most appropriate transmission power
adjustment decision. It is obvious that the presented game the-
oretic technique outperforms the uniform transmission power
allocation in all cases, in terms of the power consumption
and the achieved SINR value of each radar. Although the K-
G algorithm consumes the least power, the target detection
requirements of all the radars cannot be met, where the SINRs
are below the specified SINR threshold. In particular, the
ANCPCA transmits the most power due to the radars’ self-
interested non-cooperative behaviour in the game process,
which is consistent with the results in [33]. Specifically, if
one of the radars in the multiple-radar system cannot reach
or guarantee its predefined SINR threshold, it resorts to the
only means of increasing the transmission power to maintain
the desired SINR performance, as do other radars in a similar
situation. Consequently, the power-saving performance of the
distributed multiple-radar architectures degrades. The results
further reveal the superiority of the proposed NGTPA strategy
compared to other existing approaches.
In order to illustrate the effects of the distributed multiple-
radar configurations on the coexisting communication system,
Fig.8 presents a histogram of the interference power level
received at the communication system, comparing the four
algorithms for the different cases. As we can observe, the
interference power levels for the proposed strategy and K-
G algorithm are much lower than the NGTUPA method
and ANCPCA, which are below the maximum interference
tolerant limit Tmax for communication system in all scenarios.
Thus, the QoS can be guaranteed by ensuring the multiple
radars do not generate high interference to the communication
system. However, as previously stated, the K-G algorithm is
not ideal because the SINR requirement of each radar cannot
be satisfied. Finally, it should be noted that the proposed
NGTPA strategy outperforms other state of the art techniques
in terms of power saving, target detection performance, and
spectrum coexistence performance between multistatic radar
and communication system in the same frequency band.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we have investigated a non-cooperative game
theoretic power allocation strategy for distributed multiple-
radar configurations in a spectrum sharing environment. The
primary goal is to minimize the power consumption of each
radar by optimizing the transmission power allocation, which
are constrained by a predefined SINR requirement for target
detection and a maximum interference tolerant limit for com-
munication system. Then, the Nash equilibrium of the NGTPA
model was obtained based on the Lagrangian dual function
and sub-gradient method, and the existence and uniqueness of
Nash equilibrium were proved. To attain the Nash equilibrium
in a distributed manner, we also proposed an iterative power
allocation algorithm with low computational complexity and
fast convergence. Finally, the convergence and performance
of the proposed NGTPA strategy were further evaluated by
numerical simulations. It was shown that the optimal power
allocation strategy of a multiple-radar system is dependent
on the target’s RCS and the relative geometry between target
and distributed multiple-radar architectures. In particular, the
received interference power at the communication system is
below the maximum interference tolerant limit in various sce-
narios. The presented scheme also strengthens the distributed
nature of the system with significant reduction on the signaling
overhead, illustrating its potential for a practical application.
In future work, we will extend the non-cooperative game
theoretic power allocation to a multiple-target case and con-
centrate on the other game theoretic power allocation for
spectrum sharing in distributed multiple-radar architecture.
As previously stated, with the fine detection performance
to retrieve the exact target’s position and characteristics, the
proposed NGTPA strategy can be extended to target tracking
application by adding target kinematic model, which will also
be part of our future work.
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